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IA.1 Data appendix
The panel sample of linked survey and administrative information consists of 12,433 welfare recipients. Table I .0 shows the means of the pre-treatment health outcomes and employment status at interview 1 for the panel cases and those who only responded in the first wave. The means are very similar for all variables. (binary) .779 .787 Gastro-intestinal problems (binary) . 157 .146 Cardiovascular problems (binary) . 200 .200 Nerval problems, anxieties (binary) .189 .188 Allergies, skin problems (binary) . 214 .214 Probl. w. back, neck, spine, intervertebral discs (bin.) .381 .408 Problems with bones, joints (binary) . 246 .240 Problems with sleeping (binary) . 256 .264 Other symptoms (binary) .042 .042 No symptoms (binary) . 304 .282 Receiving welfare .859 .884 Employed .137 .136 In programme .097 .110 In order to identify the effect of a change in the welfare state, we are interested in individuals that had not been on welfare for too long before interview 1. The reason is that otherwise the follow-up period after a switch into employment or a programme would be relatively short compared to the pre-transition period on welfare, such that the health state after the transition might be predominantly driven by the long welfare history. In other words, if health deteriorates while being on welfare and it does so for a long time, the short term health effects of finding employment may be negligible vis-à-vis of the long term welfare receipt. We therefore restrict the sample to individuals who had entered welfare within the last 12 months before interview 1, which leaves us with 4,946 panel cases. Furthermore, we discard individuals that stated not to receive welfare benefits at interview 1 (246 obs.) and those younger than 26 (1486), as our interest lies on prime age workers with completed education. Lastly, we drop observations with missing values in the outcomes (183) and pretransition outcomes (182) of interest.
As shown in Table I .1, the final evaluation sample consists of 2,849 individuals, for whom three states are considered: remaining on welfare (W), finding employment (E), and programme participation (P). 1 The time span between interviews 1 and 2 is divided into months. The survey contains information on welfare receipt, employment, and programme participation in each month, which was reciprocally asked in interview 2. As the outcome variables are measured at interview 2, the transition period contains all months after interview 1 up to (and including) the last month before interview 2. Note that the transition periods of various individuals may differ in length and timing, as interviews 1 were conducted between January and April 2007 and interviews 2 between November 2007 and March 2008. Whereas state W is defined as receiving welfare over the whole transition period, E and P only require to be employed or in a programme, respectively, for at least one month in the transition period. Thus, the latter comprise individuals that enter a programme or employment both temporarily or permanently between the two interviews.
Furthermore, we condition on not being employed at interview 1 for the comparison E-W, on not participating in a programme for P-W and on neither being employed nor participating in a programme for E-P. E.g., when evaluating E-W, only welfare recipients not working at 1 The majority of programmes are relatively short job search assistance and training programmes, as well as workfare programmes.
interview 1 are compared to each other. By doing so, the health effects of switching into employment are identified and confounding with an ongoing employment spell that started already in the pre-transition period is prevented. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) , an absolute standardized difference of more than 20 is 'large'. Mean absolute standardized difference: 9.47 Notes: Bold and italic: Bias significant at the 1% level. Bold: Bias significant at the 5% level. Italic: Bias significant at the 10% level. *SD= standardized difference. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) , an absolute standardized difference of more than 20 is 'large'. Mean absolute standardized difference: 3.44 Notes: Bold and italic: Bias significant at the 1% level. Bold: Bias significant at the 5% level. Italic: Bias significant at the 10% level. *SD= standardized difference. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) , an absolute standardized difference of more than 20 is 'large'.
IA.2 Estimation results for selection into treatment

IA.3 Match quality
Table I.9: After matching balance tests for employment (E) vs. programme participation (P)
IA.4 Instrument-based identification and semiparametric IV estimation
As at least a subset of identifying assumptions underlying any causal analysis is not testable, it would be valuable to have available alternative identification strategies that appear to be equally credible. Ideally, both strategies should lead to similar results, or at least not contradict each other. Below we argue that there exists an instrumental variable (IV) strategy that also identifies the health effects of employment vs. remaining on welfare.
Identification based on instrumental variables hinges on the availability of a variable that is correlated with the welfare state but has no direct effect on the outcome, an instrument. We argue that the indicator variable 'possession of a driver's licence' is, at least conditional on other observed factors, a valid instrument for the welfare-to-employment transition. It is quite intuitive that the possession of a driver's license has a positive correlation with the probability to find work. Firstly, a driver's license increases the mobility and the likelihood to accept jobs that are more distant from home. Secondly, it represents a form of human capital that might be substantial for jobs targeted at low-educated individuals (e.g., carrier services). Indeed, the data show a positive correlation between license possession and transition into employment, significant at the 5 % level. The variation in the instrument is quite substantial, as only 62% of the individuals in the sample have a driver's license, which is more than 10% less than the German average. 2 However, for the instrument to be 'valid' it must be plausible that there are no direct effects of license possession on health. This may be challenged in the case of a recently obtained driver's license, which abruptly increases mobility and the possibility to extend social 2 According to the survey "Typologie der Wünsche 2006/2007" which was conducted in 2006/07 and is representative for the German population older than 13. For details, see http://de.statista.org/statistik/diagramm/studie/32090/umfrage /besitz-pkw-fuehrerschein/#info. The difference is plausible given that we observe a particular share of the German population that is poorer, less educated, and less attached to the labour market than the average. contacts, and might affect mental health for this reason. It, therefore, seems advisable to exclude individuals that obtained their licenses rather recently. Even though the data do not contain the licence's issue date, they contain information on the age at which individuals usually receive their driver's license. The share of license possessors conditional on age increases steadily up to the age of 26 when it reaches its peak (roughly 75%) and declines slowly afterwards to 62% for the age group 60-65. This suggests that increases below 26 are mainly growth driven, i.e., they are caused by individuals who recently passed the driving test. The moderate declines above 26 are most likely due to cohort effects as older generations (and among them, particularly women) are less likely to ever obtain a driver's license. To reinforce the plausibility of the instrument, we therefore exclude individuals younger than 26.
The instrument validity (exclusion restriction) is also violated if some characteristics are jointly related to license possession and health. Two potential confounders already mentioned are age (cohort effects) and gender (role models). Furthermore, the instrument is correlated with the socio-economic status (income, wealth, education, and profession) if wealthier individuals are more inclined to invest in a driver's license. 3 We would also expect that marital status, household composition and the presence of children are joint determinants, as families might prefer to invest in private mobility whereas single households might not. Urbanization and the availability of public transport as substitute for private mobility are further potential determinants. Social networks, milieu, and migration background might also shape preferences concerning driving. Effort and ability reflect the non-monetary cost of passing the driving test.
Finally, it seems plausible that the possession of a driver's license varies with initial health and disability status. The German Road Traffic Law itself states, albeit very broadly, that only persons who are physically and mentally fit and have not harshly or repeatedly violated the traffic regulations or penal laws are 'suitable' to drive a car (see § 2 paragraph 4 of the German "Straßenverkehrsgesetz"). Note, however, that with the exception of an obligatory eye test, physical and mental health is not checked when obtaining the driver's license for the first time. Health checks only take place when intending to regain a driver's license after its withdrawal due to the violation of legal regulations (e.g. drunk driving). Still, the latter case might bear some relevance in the population considered.
It can be reasonably argued that all factors discussed are also related to the health outcomes in one or the other way. This implies that the instrument is only valid conditional on the aforementioned confounders. Our data allow us to either directly observe or to proxy these factors potentially related to the instrument and the outcomes in most cases. However, one shortcoming is that the survey does not cover information on blindness and sight defects. Furthermore, the way health is reported in the survey might not perfectly reflect the criteria which are crucial for the obligatory health checks (after the withdrawal of the license).
Despite these issues, we still think that the conditional validity of the instrument is close to being satisfied. Descriptive statistics for potential IV confounders are provided in the internet appendix.
Under some conditions, the IV approach identifies the so-called local average treatment effect (LATE), which is in our case the mean effect of employment on health among those individuals not working without driver's license and working with a licence. It is thus the average causal effect for those who comply in the sense that they switch from welfare to employment if they are provided with a driver's license. If the health effects are heterogeneous, one could expect the LATE to differ from the other causal effects presented in the previous sections, as it refers to a different population, namely the compliers. See Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) for an in depth discussion of the LATE parameter and its identifying assumptions.
For semi-parametric LATE estimation, we use procedures that take the form of a ratio of two propensity score matching estimators. They were proposed by Frölich (2007) as an extension to Imbens and Angrist (1994) , who discuss identification for an unconditionally valid instrument, for the case when the instrument Z is only valid conditional on observed estimation is only precise if the share of compliers is not too small, implying that the instrument is sufficiently relevant.
Even though semi-parametric estimators may be less precise than parametric 2SLS, they seem preferable for several reasons. Firstly, the functional form assumptions of 2SLS are far from being innocuous. Secondly, 2SLS does not allow controlling for additional covariates in a general form when the instrument is only conditionally valid. Thirdly, as our outcome variables are binary in most cases, a linear 2SLS model would constitute a gross misspecification.
A problem of IV based inference in finite samples is that the moments of the estimator may not exist such that t-statistics are misleading. We therefore bootstrap the LATE estimates 4999 times to approximate their distributions. This allows us to compute p-values and confidence intervals.The LATE estimates are reported in Table I .12 along with quantiles of the effects' distributions obtained from the bootstrap replications and the estimates of the intention to treat (ITT) effects. Due to the small proportion of compliers (roughly 15%) the LATE estimates are rather imprecise (none is statistically different from zero at the 10% level) and should not be taken at face value. We merely use them to check the robustness of the matching estimates. In fact, each of the latter is included in the 90% confidence interval of the respective LATE estimate. 
Welfare receipt in Germany
In Germany, welfare payments are made to people with no or insufficient income to support themselves and dependent household members. At least about half of all recipients are unemployed individuals who are ineligible for unemployment insurance payments (so-called unemployment benefits I, UBI) or who have become ineligible because of exhaustion of their UBI claim. 5 For this reason, the welfare payments are named unemployment benefits II (UBII), but they are commonly referred to as Hartz IV. 6 In summary, German welfare recipients have unfavourable employment histories, are (long-term) unemployed, or employed with very low earnings.
The welfare payments are means-tested. The test is based on the wealth and income of all individuals in the household. The standard benefit per adult was 345 € in the period we consider and is 351 € in 2009. The amount households receive for partners and children is lower.
Accommodation and heating costs are also covered (up to a maximum) and paid directly to the property owners. The welfare payments also include compulsory social insurance contributions (in particular health and pension insurance). Further costs for special needs like initial equipment for a newborn child or a washing machine etc. might be covered as well.
Access to welfare is conditional. Claimants who are capable of working at least 15 hours per week have to register with the local employment office and are obliged to participate in 5 UBI eligibility requires contribution to unemployment insurance (i.e. being employed in a job subject to social insurance) for at least 12 out of 24 months prior to becoming unemployed. Depending on the length of contributory employment and age the maximum claim varies between 6 and 24 months. The replacement rate is 67% (60%) of previous average net income with (without) dependent children, respectively. welfare-to-work programmes if requested. The welfare recipients' rights and obligations are usually set out in writing in a so-called integration contract. This binding agreement between the employment office and the welfare recipient contains obligations concerning programme participation and job search activities as well as services provided by the employment office.
Non-compliance and/or the rejection of 'acceptable' job offers can be sanctioned by temporary benefit cuts. 7
The number of welfare recipients in Germany amounted to roughly 4.5 million in January 2005. It increased steadily during 2005 -partly due to the so-called Hartz IV reforms, which introduced the current system -and reached a peak of 5.5 million in April 2006. Since then it has declined to just below 5 million in August 2008. In January 2005, there were 2.3 million unemployed persons receiving welfare benefits. This number increased during the following months to peak at roughly 3 million at the beginning of 2006. Since then the share of unemployed among welfare recipients declined to 2.2 million in August 2008. 7 According to the legislation, almost any job is acceptable, even if it does not correspond to the individual's former profession or education.
